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Iosifidis, P. and M. Wheeler (2018) ‘Modern Political Communication and Web 2.0 in 
Representative Democracies’, Javnost/The Public, 25th Anniversary issue, 25(1-2). 
Abstract 
During the first two decades of the Twenty-First Century, the social media has facilitated 
interactive communications between the political elites and public. In the 2016 UK 
Referendum, the social media became a vehicle for contested political arguments and post-
truth positions defined the Remain and Leave camps. For instance, it was claimed that the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant tweets 
influenced many voters. In the 2016 US Presidential election, the victorious celebrity 
property tycoon Donald Trump maintained a controversial online presence. He posted tweets 
about his campaign and engaged in a blatantly hateful online discourse aimed at his political 
opponents. Therefore, does such a usage of the social media aid democratic representation or 
contribute to a greater destabilization of modern politics? 
 
Keywords: Social media; Hybrid; Social Movement; Anti-establishment; Irrational 
discourse. 
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Introduction 
 
During first two decades of the Twenty-First Century, the Internet emerged from being an 
add-on to the television based campaigns in western liberal democracies to becoming an 
essential component within the wider communication of politics. In some respects, the 
traditional forms of political advertising and alternative forms of elite-public relations have 
created more plural relations with the electorate through the employment of party websites, 
candidate blogs and the incorporation of social networks such as Facebook, You Tube and 
Twitter. However, the social media platforms have been seen to more significantly 
reconfigure interactive communications between apparently ‘anti-establishment’ capitalist 
interests and the public to establish new forms of participation. 
 
This article will consider how politicians have employed the social media to affect 
major changes in recent US Presidential campaigns and the EU Referendum. It will employ 
Andrew Chadwick’s concept of the ‘hybrid media system’ to consider how the social media 
has been incorporated into mainstream political communication strategies: 
 
The hybrid media system is built upon interactions among older and new media logics 
--- where logics are defined as technologies, genres norms, behaviours and 
organisational forms --- in the reflexively connected fields of media and politics 
(Chadwick, 2013: 12). 
 
Such hybridity is reflective of the fragmentation of the media audience; the dissolution of 
centralized party systems; grassroots political activity; the rise of generic 24/7 news channels 
and citizen journalism; the global consumption of infotainment and a greater fluidity within 
political ideologies, presentation and marketing (Ibid: 12). In this respect, the US Democratic 
Presidential candidacies of Howard Dean in 2004 and Barack Obama in 2008/ 2012 proved to 
be ‘game-changers’ in shaping the political employment of the social media. While Dean 
showed how the web could announce his candidacy, Obama demonstrated how to ‘run an 
Internet campaign that [used] all the relevant media, most notably television, to blend 
centralisation, control and hierarchy with decentralisation, devolution, and horizontality’ 
(Ibid: 209).  
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Most recently, the Republican Presidential victor Donald Trump utilized the social 
media to reach out a disaffected electoral base to win the 2016 Presidential election against 
Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton. The highly controversial Trump, who had established 
his media capital as a property tycoon and television celebrity on The Apprentice (2004-
onwards), developed his online presence through Twitter, where he has regularly posted 
comments about his campaign, other candidates, political views, and the ‘rigged’ mainstream 
media coverage. Trump was notorious for his negative, aggressive, and sometimes blatantly 
hateful tweets, in which he routinely calls his opponents, political and otherwise, ‘losers’ and 
‘haters.’ For many, the Trump campaign was accompanied by the rise of ‘fake news’ via 
close advisor Steve Bannon’s online Breitbart News, information provocateurs and ‘post-
truth’ politics.  
 
In tandem, the European Union (EU) Referendum which led to the ‘Brexit’ decision 
in 2016 was accompanied by the populist online narrative. The social media echo-chamber 
tended to reinforce the anti-European rhetoric within the mainstream media led by a chorus of 
Brexit-led newspapers and Leave campaigners. Across the social media, anti-immigrant 
sentiment was fuelled by the view that dysfunctional European elite was bent on undermining 
Britain’s economy, sovereignty and self-confidence. This led to the xenophobic falsehoods 
claiming that a Vote Leave outcome would Canute-like turn back the ‘waves’ of immigrants 
who were ready to pounce from Eastern Europe and the Syrian refugee crisis. 
Therefore, have the modern examples of the deployment of the social media within 
political campaigns aided democratic forms of political representation or have they 
contributed to a greater destabilization of modern politics? Moreover, have the new 
communications techniques overcome the perception of a democratic deficit or have they 
contributed to a greater sense alienation and distrust in the political process? 
 
US Presidential Elections --- the Internet from the periphery to the centre of campaign 
operations 
Throughout the early Internet campaigns within the 1990s and 2000s, the social media was 
seen as a supplementary medium to television. Invariably, Presidential candidates continued 
to plough their resources into traditional spot adverts and the buying up of air-time. However, 
this attitude changed when the little-known Governor of Vermont Howard Dean ran for the 
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Presidential nomination in the 2004 Democratic Primaries. Dean not only used the Internet 
for funding drives and campaign communications but to open up the way for a ‘citizen-
initiated’ approach (Gibson, 2010: 7).In turn, Barack Obama would take significant 
advantage of the social media while continuing to employ the political communications 
principles drawn from the television age (Chadwick, 2013: 199). 
In 2008, a significant change in political campaign management occurred as Obama 
realized that the social media could facilitate a ‘shift ... toward a looser ‘hybrid’ mode of 
operation that incorporated the network tactics of protest movements’ (Gibson, 2010: 5). The 
Obama campaign established the MyBo site which after a straightforward registration 
process, offered users with a wide degree of involvement in an online political community. It 
encouraged recruitment drives and enabled local associations, invariably drawn from youth 
groups, college students and non-traditional political actors to organise as grassroots activists, 
thereby working in an inclusive and relational manner (Bang, 2009: 132).  
Therefore, across the battleground states, Obama’s utilisation of social networking 
technologies enabled his campaign organisation to swell to 1.5 million community 
organisers.  To aid their door-to-door canvassing, volunteers accessed constantly updated 
databases through field offices and via MyBo concerning information about potential voters’ 
political leanings (Lai Stirland, 2008). This blend of volunteering, gumshoe canvassing and 
information processing became the hallmark of the Obama campaign as it: 
(built, tweaked and tinkered) with its technology and organisational infrastructure ... 
to successfully integrate technology with a revamped model of political organisation 
that stresses volunteer participation and feedback on a massive scale (Ibid). 
Through these inclusive techniques, Obama remained in constant touch with his core support 
and attracted online activists. He defined a political image founded on reciprocity to 
encourage the popular scrutiny of his ideas. Obama’s social media campaign represented 
more than just ‘Obama as a candidate’ but enabled him to galvanize a social movement 
mobilized by ‘Obama as a cause’ (Heilemann and Halperin, 2010: 52). Throughout the 2008 
and 2012 campaigns, Obama’s approach demonstrated how Internet had reconfigured the 
nature of political marketing: 
What resulted was not only a victory for the Democrats and Obama, but also the 
legacy of what was widely regarded as one of the most effective Internet marketing 
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plans in history—where social media and technology enabled the individual to 
activate and participate in a movement (Chang, 2008: 2). 
 
Donald Trump --- Voice and Output: Political Outsider, Outrage and Charismatic 
Authority in 140 Characters 
While, in many respects, Obama and Trump were the polar opposites of one another, 
Trump’s 2016 campaign built upon Obama’s online presence by re-configuring notions of 
reciprocity and reaching out to an electoral base via the social media. Further hybridity 
occurred between Trump’s media stardom, his construction of a social movement and his 
utilization of charismatic demagoguery across the Internet.  Like other 21st Century political 
candidates Trump maintained a presence across social media platforms. He used many 
obvious techniques (direct address, polling audience, posting pictures with his family and 
behind the scenes information). However, Trump’s most notable online contributions 
occurred via Twitter, where he posted comments on a daily basis about his right-wing 
political views, the success of his campaign and the ‘unfair’ coverage he received in the 
mainstream media.  
Trump’s Twitter handle itself @realDonaldTrump—directly communicated the idea 
that the content he presented was genuine and unfiltered so he could speak to a broader social 
movement. He used Twitter to point out the alleged fakery of others to position him as an 
honest, plain-spoken, unfiltered foil, whose brash sincerity and unapologetic vehemence 
stood as a pillar of his brand. Twitter enabled Trump to provide a public voice with an 
increasingly disaffected public when he claimed he would ‘drain the swamp’ within the 
Washington beltway.  
As an outsider ‘businessman’ Trump rallied against the elites and special interests, 
while maximising his own personal and financial attributes to build up reciprocal relations 
with his online audiences who enjoyed his reactionary populism. Consequently, it was Trump 
the maverick billionaire capitalist, who had never stood for any other political office, that 
managed to present himself as the ‘anti-establishment’ candidate by blackening his media 
critics, Republican Party Primary opponents such as Senators Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio, 
and ultimately the Democratic Presidential nominee --- ‘Crooked’ Hilary Clinton. Therefore, 
through such ‘authenticity’ he established a deep and rooted connection with the rust-belt 
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electorate who felt they had been ignored and betrayed by the political and media 
establishments.  
He used his hybrid media/ digital presence to enhance his personal brand which had 
been created via the tropes of Reality TV, Gossip Columns and Talk Radio to establish a 
form of political capital with the American public. Trump provided an expression of celebrity 
leadership via the interface of social media platforms with his outrageous media 
performances throughout the primary and election debates, alongside campaign rallies where 
he rallied his supporters that he would imprison Clinton. He successfully propelled his 
candidacy through a purposefully controversial social media performance in which he 
engaged in an outlandish and hateful commentary. In such a manner, he constructed a 
deliberate and contradictory news agenda which demonstrated that:  
The only thing that’s really changed between Trump’s other attempts to run for office 
and now is the advent of social media. And Trump, who has spent his life offending 
people, knows exactly how to bend it to his will. … The more the TV shows talk 
about him, the more we all talk about him. If you want to truly comprehend why 
Trump is so popular, you just have to behold what people are saying in 140 characters 
(http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/04/how-silicon-valley-created-donald-trump). 
An early example of Trump’s outrageous Twitter ‘performance’ was evident when he 
engaged in a sexist and derogatory attack upon the ex-Fox New Presenter and GOP (Grand 
Old Party) primary debate moderator Megyn Keller. Previously, she had had the temerity of 
being critical of his political grandstanding, so Trump tweeted, and ‘I refuse to call Megyn 
Kelly a bimbo, because that would not be politically correct. Instead I will only call her a 
lightweight reporter!’ (http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/history-donald-trump-megyn-kelly-
feud/story?id=36526503). 
Throughout the 2016 President campaign, Trump mastered Twitter unlike any other 
presidential candidate before him by unleashing its power to be a tool of political promotion, 
distraction, score-settling and attack. In the process, he fulfilled the fantasies of those social 
media avatars who had predicted a White House candidacy that would replace the expensive 
conventions of political communication with a campaign which emphasized the urgent and 
visceral nature of the social media. As Trump has shown, within online modern political 
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campaigns there has been a recurring focus on an imagery that gives ‘voice’ to the irrational 
and projects an ego who seeks constant attention: 
If we’re talking about them, [he is] winning the war for attention. No one knows this 
better than Trump. Prod the social-media tiger, you get attention: say Mexicans are 
rapists, make fun of the disabled, pick a fight with the Pope, attack women, call the 
media dumb, and social media shines a big, bright spotlight on Donald 
(http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/04/how-silicon-valley-created-donald-trump). 
 
EU and Brexit: fake news on the social media 
Donald Trump’s victory was welcomed by the variety of new, populist right-wing political 
parties across Europe. These parties have spread populist nationalism which had placed 
pressure upon the project of the European Union (EU) which was designed to promote 
democracy, freedom, peace and economic reconstruction. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the 
National Front political party, promises that she would pull France out of the Euro and hold a 
‘Frexit’ referendum on membership of the EU. She told CNN in an interview that Trump’s 
victory is ‘a sign of hope for those who cannot bear wild globalization’ 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/15/politics/marine-le-pen-interview-donald-trump/). Similar 
to Le Pen, like-minded Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has heralded Trump’s 
election victory as the end of ‘liberal non-democracy’ 
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/donald-trump-us-election-win-hungarian-
prime-minister-viktor-orban-end-liberal-non-democracy-a7413236.html). 
The biggest upset to the EU project occurred on 23 June 2016 when the British people 
decided in a referendum to leave the EU by almost 52% to 48%. The vote for Brexit has been 
well-documented and several explanations have been put forth, though two factors mattered 
the most: immigration and sovereignty, both representing a desire for people to take back 
control of their own lives and the feeling that they are unrepresented by politicians. These 
ideas signify fear and alienation and represented a retreat back towards nationalism and 
borders. The media influenced the referendum result as the reporting of  immigration 
particularly in the tabloid press was extremely negative well before the campaign began, with 
a steady stream of stories about immigrants ‘sponging’ off the welfare state, ‘bleeding the 
National Health Service dry and being involved in 
8 
 
criminality’(http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-1-
context/understanding-the-role-of-the-mass-media-in-the-eu-referendum/).  
But it was not only the mainstream media that played a role in the decision to leave 
the European Union. In fact, the EU referendum can be dubbed as the first ‘digital 
referendum’ because both the official Leave (‘Vote Leave’) and Remain (‘Britain Stronger in 
Europe’) campaigns utilised key aspects of the successful Obama model developed during the 
2008 and 2012 US Presidential Elections. In an effort to identify and then mobilise their 
respective followers, the two opposite campaigns used big data mining, data analysis, micro-
targeting and social media for intelligence gathering purposes to construct detailed and 
personalised voter profiles.  
The Internet and social media were heavily used for getting their messages across the 
electorate, though the Leave campaign was much more successful at targeting than the 
Remain campaign eventually resulting in victory (http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-
referendum-analysis-2016/section-7-social-media/leave-versus-remain-the-digital-battle/). A 
large-scale social media data analysis demonstrates that not only did Brexit supporters have a 
more powerful and emotional message, but they were also more effective in the use of social 
media like Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. A combination of factors, such as the more 
intuitive and straightforward messaging by the Leave campaign (which is crucial for social 
media campaigning) and the highly emotionally charged nature of messages (which 
facilitated the viral spread of Leave ideas) led to the activation of a greater number of Leave 
followers at grassroots level, something that eventually influenced many undecided voters 
(http://www.referendumanalysis.eu/eu-referendum-analysis-2016/section-7-social-
media/impact-of-social-media-on-the-outcome-of-the-eu-referendum/). 
So the EU referendum showed that social media tools can be used to shape the public 
agenda, form public opinion and drive social change – for better or for worse. In parallel with 
Trump’s sensational victory, the vote for Brexit was secured in what has been dubbed the era 
of ‘post-truth politics’ largely based on fake news, the misuse of statistics and appeals to 
emotion rather than policies and facts. In this capacity, hybrid media and online discourses 
constructed a potent ‘politics of fear’ which impacted on the UK electorate’s political 
thinking. It may yet prove a costly game for the British people and the rest of the EU citizens. 
One worrying trend in the new world is that stretching the truth can be seen as just part of a 
game. European leaders are struggling to absorb the impact of Internet-spread fake news 
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on balloting around the world as the continent faces a series of elections during 2017 that 
will reshape its future. Post-truth in politics is one of the drivers of populism and it is one of 
the threats to democracy. 
Most especially, the prominent Leave campaigner, ex-Mayor of London and 
Conservative Cabinet member Boris Johnson’s cavalier attitude to the truth received a 
significant hearing throughout the news and social media during the EU Referendum 
Campaign. Jonathan Freedland compared Johnson with Trump by declaring him to be a 
‘post-truth’ politician: 
Johnson reminded us that he has more in common with Trump than just a lovingly 
styled, idiosyncratic head of blond hair. … On BBC Radio 4’s Today programme, 
Johnson reminded listeners how slippery his grasp on the truth has long been. … As 
with Trump, humour plays a crucial part. ... Too often, radio and TV interviewers 
want to appear in on the joke, to share in the chuckle … But it’s clear why this 
matters … (as) … how can we have a functioning democracy when we cannot agree 
on the most basic facts? 
(http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/13/boris-johnson-donald-
trump-post-truth-politician.) 
By engaging in a race to the bottom, Johnson’s unreliable political discourse (along 
with that of the UK Independence Party – UKIP - leader Nigel Farage) meant that his 
arguments concerning the EU debate were distorted around immigration. Therefore, 
Johnson’s wilful irresponsibility (with Michael Gove, Chris Grayling, Ian Duncan Smith, 
John Mann and Frank Field) was a contributory factor to the ‘ugliness’ that surrounded the 
national conversation about the referendum 
The leader of UKIP Nigel Farage, a European Parliament politician who had a key 
role in the Brexit plebiscite, played a nationalist card by depicting hordes of Middle Eastern 
immigrants ready to land in the UK in campaign posters. Farage’s infamous ‘Breaking Point’ 
poster can be described as a ‘fake’ since it showed a queue of migrants at the Croatia-
Slovenia border, trying to get into Britain. Johnson and Gove, leaders of the Vote Leave 
campaign, also played the immigration card and delivered fake news as one of its posters 
claimed: ‘Turkey (population 76 million) is joining the EU’ and Penny Mordaunt, a Defence 
Minister, claimed the Government would not be able to stop Turkish criminals entering the 
UK or to veto Turkey’s EU accession (the latter a downright lie). The ultimate piece of fake 
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news was the claim that leaving would provide a £350m-a-week bonus for the NHS from the 
UK’s contribution to EU coffers (http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/michael-gove-boris-
johnson-brexit-eurosceptic-press-theresa-may-a7533806.html) 
Anticipating/echoing Trump, another main slogan of the Brexiteers’ was ‘we want our 
country back’. But given that Parliamentary scrutiny for Theresa May’s Brexit strategy is 
strictly limited in the post-Referendum era, the irony is that Brexit is not restoring the 
sovereignty of the UK Parliament. As for the journalists who forecast long-term severe 
economic consequences for a post-Brexit UK economy (in particular, fall in the pound and 
higher inflation), these are criticised by Brexiteers as ‘unpatriotic’ who write ‘hyped up 
media reports’, quite similar to Trump’s ‘fake news’ attack.  
 
Conclusion 
US Presidential candidates initially treated the Internet with circumspection as they remained 
unconvinced about whether there could be a greater outreach to the electorate. However, as 
the Internet rapidly expanded, the new communications formats of the social media offered 
the politicians with greater opportunities to reconfigure their campaign strategies. Obama was 
to realize the full worth of these campaign strategies in 2008. He employed a hybrid media 
approach in which he used more traditional forms of image management, along with a 
communitarian-inspired approach to the social media to affect a political movement. Through 
Obama’s intricate machine of a network of volunteers he won key states in the Democratic 
Primaries from the front-runner Senator Hillary Clinton and in the General Election against 
his opponent Republican Senator John McCain.  
Clinton faced another new social media form of political communication when she 
was pitched against Donald Trump in 2016. Trump had enjoyed national name recognition 
and bullish reputation since the 1980s thanks to his business empire, which includes real 
estate, casinos, resorts and golf courses, books, and beauty pageants. In 2010s, Trump had 
become a brand and he stridently developed his populist celebrity by questioning the 
legitimacy of Obama’s birth rights to rule as US President. Therefore, he used his celebrity 
capital as a base to change the parameters of social media campaigning with his negative, 
aggressive, and hateful employment of Twitter which reflect his para-social relationship with 
the American public. By lashing out at his political opponents and using cruel humour, he 
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positioned himself as the anti-establishment candidate who regularly tweeted his contempt of 
the political elite to directly speak and activate a disaffected electoral base.  
In the UK, the EU Referendum and in particular the Leave Campaign that was master 
mined by political leaders Boris Johnson and Michael Gove’s precipitous excess in distorting 
truths, delivering notions of sovereignty and patriotism that veiled a strain of xenophobia, and 
spreading negative views against immigrants through social media proved effective for 
mobilising the majority. In its 2016 report the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee noted that ‘the public debate is being poorly served by inconsistent, unqualified 
and, in some cases, misleading claims and counter-claims.’ It is then hard to argue that the 
EU Referendum, characterised by falsehoods and fairy tales disseminated by social media, 
actually benefited the British democratic system. 
Trump, along with the Brexiteers, became the ultimate manifestation of ‘voice’ and 
‘output.’ Here it is contended that virtuous civic duties are being replaced by alternative 
forms of engagement and participation in which the outcomes may play out to public 
prejudice. John Keane (2009) maintains that a ‘Monitory Democracy’, in which consumer led 
representations have become the measurement of accountability. Most especially, the social 
media contains both opportunities for pluralism and the manifestation of public obedience to 
re-configured elites who proclaim to represent the dispossessed. Trump’s Twitter strategy 
explicitly enhanced his charismatic authority which, as outlined by Max Weber, rests on the 
individual’s ability to continuously ‘prove’ his legitimacy, determination, and strength; when 
he does so, followers are compelled to ‘faithfully surrender’ to him (Weber, 1946: 78). In 
tandem, reading the EU Referendum campaign in terms of some of the personalities involved 
suggests that key figures such as Farage positioned himself as outsider to elite political 
institutions, thereby aligning himself (like Trump) with the disenfranchised masses, while  
Johnson’s political opportunism and desire for individual political power led to an 
emotionally charged campaign and eventually incoherent exit strategy. 
This means that these types of engagement with social media are highly questionable 
in preserving political consensus and have exposed the fissures in modern democracies. 
Therefore, from these examples, a mixed picture has occurred with regard to the usage of 
online techniques in representative democracies and there are still many questions about 
whether they actually encourage a greater form of public efficacy. Most observers today 
concur that especially in regard to social media, modern communication technologies have 
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impacted profoundly on politics and participation. But the problem is that there is still no 
overarching agreement in terms of how and to what extent this impact takes place, and what 
significance it has for democratic politics (Iosifidis and Wheeler, 2016). In the cases of 
Trump’s Twitter strategy and the use of social media by Brexiteers it is clear that the social 
media engagement has been highly controversial in relation to democratic deficits and that 
the usage of online techniques has left open questions as to whether democratic consensus 
can be achieved. 
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